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Abstract
We study the asymptotic value of a frequency-dependent zero-sum game with sepa-
rable payoff following a differential approach. The stage payoffs in such games depend
on the current actions and on a linear function of the frequency of actions played so
far. We associate to the repeated game, in a natural way, a differential game and al-
though the latter presents an irregularity at the origin, we prove that it has a value. We
conclude, using appropriate approximations, that the asymptotic value of the original
game exists in both the n-stage and the λ-discounted games and that it coincides with
the value of the continuous time game.
Keywords: stochastic game, frequency-dependent payoffs, continuous-time game, dis-
cretization, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation.
JEL Classification: C73 AMS Classification: 91A15 91A23 91A25
Introduction
Frequency-dependent games are repeated games where the stage payoffs depend on cur-
rent actions and on frequency of past actions. The interpretation is that in such games, the
actions undertaken by the players at each stage may generate externalities, which accumu-
late as the game unfolds. Stage payoffs may be frequency-dependent over time for several
reasons. For instance, payoffs may change due to learning, habit formation, addiction, or
satiation. The class of frequency-dependent games covers a wide variety of applications
such as littering and pollution problems, the impact of human activities on other species
and more generally on the environment. Frequency-dependent games were introduced by
Brenner and Witt (2003) as a class of dynamic games with stage payoffs depending on the
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frequency of past actions. To the best of our knowledge, in the context of repeated games,
Smale (1980) was the first to study dynamics that take the past into account. The for-
mer games consist in the repetition of a one-shot game in which the stage payoff depends
on the choices of the players at the current stage, as well as on the relative frequencies of
actions played at previous stages. An extensive review of this class of games and its appli-
cations can be found in Joosten et al. (2003), where the authors focus mostly on the infinite
horizon general frequency-dependent games and in particular derive several Folk-Theorem-
like. Moreover, Contou-Carrère (2011) recently studied some aspects of frequency-dependent
games. The main insight of this work lies in the fact that on the one hand no uniform value
exists even for a one-player game and on the other hand the asymptotic value exists although
its convergence is not uniform in the state variable. More precisely, the author considers
a particular case of the littering game (Joosten (2004)), in which the decision maker has
two actions, one that deteriorates the environment, and the other one that preserves it;
the littering action is a dominant action in each stage game, but the repeated use of this
action produces a lasting effect on the environment so that all future payoffs are decreased.
The author proves in a game with a given length n ∈ N∗ that the unique optimal strategy
consists in using the non littering action from stage t = 1 up to some stage t∗(n) and then
starting to use the littering action until the end of the play. Since the time of switching from
one action to the other depends on the length of the game, one can prove that the uniform
value does not exist in the frequency-dependent control problem. Nevertheless, the fraction
of time t∗(n)/n converges when n goes to infinity so that in particular the asymptotic value
limVn(z) exists and is independent of the initial state z, although this convergence is not
uniform in the state.
In order to characterize the Nash equilibrium payoffs of a long game, the study of the
zero-sum case seems to be necessary. In this paper, we investigate the value of a class of
two-player zero-sum frequency-dependent games with finite action sets I and J respectively,
namely the subclass of frequency-dependent games with separable payoffs1. This means that
the stage payoff is the sum of two parts, one part is derived from the current actions and the
other one depends linearly on the frequency of the past actions. This game can be viewed
as a stochastic game with countable state space, namely NI×J and deterministic transitions.
The current state at the n-th stage is the aggregate past matrix, i.e., it reflects how many
times each action profile has been selected in the previous n− 1 stages. Player 1 maximizes
and Player 2 minimizes the average payoff in the first n stages and the game is played under
perfect-monitoring, meaning that both players know the current state as well as the entire
history, i.e., the state visited and the action pair played at each of the preceding stages. Since
it is already known from the study of the one-player game that no uniform value exists, our
main focus will be the existence of the asymptotic value of this game. We treat in parallel
both the average and the discounted case. Note that the convergence being non-uniform in
the state variable (see Contou-Carrère (2011)), we cannot rely on the Tauberian theorem of
Ziliotto (2016) to deduce the existence of one of the limits from the existence of the other.
The traditional approach to the sequence (Vn)n∈N∗ is through the study of the so-called
recursive equation (see Mertens et al. (2015), Theorem 3.2, p.158). However, as in the case
of many repeated games, it seems difficult to derive the asymptotic behavior directly from
1As far as we know, in general stochastic games, payoffs with separable structure first appeared in
Parthasarathy et al. (1984). The authors study games with transitions independent of the current state.
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this formula. Therefore, we switch to a differential approach in the sense that we associate
to the repeated game, a differential game played over [0, 1]×RI×J . Indeed, by some heuris-
tic reasoning it is possible to conjecture as a limit of the recursive equation, a hypothetical
partial differential equation (PDE) that governs the evolution of the value. It turns out that
this is precisely the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI) equation of some differential
game and furthermore that the value of this continuous game is closely related to the value
of our repeated game. However, an important difficulty arises due to an irregularity of the
payoff function at the origin and it is precisely at the origin where our analysis has to be
done. Everywhere but at the origin, regularity conditions are satisfied by the payoff and
dynamics functions and since the Isaacs condition holds true, i.e., lower and upper Hamilto-
nians coincide, by Evans and Souganidis (1984)2 and Souganidis (1999), it follows existence
of the value in the differential game. Moreover, the value is characterized as the unique
viscosity solution in the space of bounded, continuous functions of the HJBI equation with a
boundary condition. Despite the irregularity at the origin, we prove existence of the value in
the differential game starting at (0, 0). In order to compare the values of the repeated game
with that of the differential game, we proceed by discretization. The previously mentioned
irregularity at the origin makes it impossible to apply the usual methods of approxima-
tions. We adapt the methods of Souganidis (1999) for finite horizon differential games (see
Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta (2008) for infinite horizon3) so that they can fit our context.
We prove that Vn as n tends to infinity, and Vλ as λ goes to zero, both converge to the
same limit which is precisely the value of the differential game starting at the origin.
In the literature, the use of differential games to study the asymptotic value of a re-
peated game is not new. A differential approach first appeared in Vieille (1992) to study
weak approachability. An approach similar to ours, has been proposed by Laraki (2002) to
prove existence of the asymptotic value in n-stage and λ-discounted repeated games with
incomplete information on one side. Cardaliaguet et al. (2012) achieve a transposition to
discrete time games of the numerical schemes used to approximate the value function of dif-
ferential games via viscosity solution arguments, presented in Barles and Souganidis (1991).
The authors prove existence of the asymptotic value in absorbing, splitting and incomplete
information games, where convergence is uniform in the state variable. Our approach differs
from all these literatures by the nature of the state space of the continuous game and chiefly
in that, due to the irregularity at the origin in our setting, existence of the value in the
continuous game is not straightforward. Since in our model, the state space is countable
following their approach would lead us to an infinite dimensional state space in the associ-
ated differential game. As a consequence, the way we associate the differential game to the
repeated game is quite different from theirs.
Structure of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 1, we give the description of a two-player frequency-dependent zero-sum game and
we provide properties of the n-stage value function, which will be useful, in the sequel. In
2Existence of the value follows from the standard comparison and uniqueness theorems for viscosity
solutions presented in Crandall and Lions (1983).
3The authors prove that under some regularity conditions on the payoff and dynamics functions, the
discrete values converge to the values of the continuous time game as the mesh of the discretization tends
to 0. These approximations do not converge in general if the value function is discontinuous.
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Section 2, starting from the recursive formula satisfied by the value, we heuristically derive
a PDE. Then, we define the associated differential game and prove existence of the value in
the differential game played over [0, 1] and starting at initial state 0. We then provide its
uniformly and λ-discounted discretized versions. In Section 3, we conclude by identifying
the value of the continuous time game, as the limit value of the n-stage and the λ-discounted
frequency-dependent games. In Section 4 we conclude.
1 The frequency-dependent game and preliminary results
In this section, we describe our model and we give some preliminary results.
1.1 Definitions
Let I, J be finite sets and denote the space of real matrices with |I| rows and |J | columns
by MI×J . The notation (eij)ij stands for the canonical basis in R
I×J , i.e., eij = (δ
i′
i δ
j′
j )i′j′ ,
where δk
′
k , k ∈ {i, j} denotes the Kronecker delta. Let A = [aij ] and H be two elements of
MI×J and let z0 ∈ Z := N
I×J . A frequency-dependent zero-sum repeated game with initial
state z0 is a dynamic game played by steps as follows:
At stage t = 1, 2, ..., Player 1 and 2 simultaneously and independently choose an action in
their own set of actions, it ∈ I and jt ∈ J respectively. The stage payoff of Player 1 is given
by:
gt := g(zt−1, it, jt) = aitjt + h(zt−1),
where zt = z0 + ei1j1 + ...+ eitjt and for any z ∈ Z,
h(z) :=
{〈
H, z|z|
〉
, z 6= 0
0, z = 0,
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the canonical inner product in RI×J and | · | stands for ‖·‖1. The payoff
of Player 2 is the opposite of that of Player 1. We assume perfect monitoring of past actions
by both players.
Notation. In the sequel, we use the notations: N∗ = N \ {0} and R∗+ = R+ \ {0}.
1.2 The values of ΓN(z0) and Γλ(z0)
Given z0 ∈ Z, for any N ∈ N
∗ and any λ ∈ (0, 1), we will be interested in the finite N -
stage and λ-discounted games of initial state z0, denoted by ΓN (z0) and Γλ(z0) respectively.
A play is given by ω := (it, jt)t∈N∗ and the induced rewards in the game of initial state z0,
is γN (z0, ω) = (1/N)
∑N
t=1 gt, (resp. γλ(z0, ω) =
∑∞
t=1 λ(1 − λ)
t−1gt). Note that, due to
the nature of the transition in the state space, announcing the selected moves publicly also
reveals the state variable to the players. Therefore, we will denote by Ht = Z × (I × J)
t−1
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the set of histories at stage t and H = ∪t≥0Ht will denote the set of all histories. ∆(I)
and ∆(J) are the sets of mixed moves of Player 1 and Player 2 respectively. A behavioral
strategy for Player 1 is a family of maps σ = (σt)t≥1, such that σt : Ht → ∆(I). Similarly,
a behavioral strategy for Player 2 is a family of maps τ = (τt)t≥1, where τt : Ht → ∆(J). Σ
and T denote the sets of behavioral strategies of Player 1 and Player 2, respectively. Given
z0 ∈ Z, each strategy profile (σ, τ) induces a unique probability distribution P
z0
σ,τ on the set
Z × (I × J)∞ of plays (endowed with the σ-field generated by the cylinders). Ez0σ,τ stands
for the corresponding expectation.
We study the games ΓN (z0) and Γλ(z0) in which the payoff of Player 1 is given by γN (z0, σ, τ) =
E
z0
σ,τ
(
1
N
∑N
t=1 gt
)
and γλ(z0, σ, τ) = E
z0
σ,τ
(∑∞
t=1 λ(1− λ)
t−1gt
)
respectively. Existence of
the value in ΓN (z) and Γλ(z) in mixed strategies follows from the minmax theorem of
von Neumann (1928) and since the game is played under perfect-recall by Kuhn’s theorem
the value can be achieved by using behavioral strategies. The N -stage and λ-discounted val-
ues are given byVN (z0) = supσ∈Σ infτ∈T γN (z0, σ, τ) andVλ(z0) = supσ∈Σ infτ∈T γλ(z0, σ, τ)
respectively. By Mertens et al. (2015) (Theorem 3.2, p.158) given (n, λ) ∈ N∗ × (0, 1] and a
state z ∈ Z, Vn and Vλ satisfy the following recursive formulas:
(n+ 1)Vn+1(z) = h(z) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
(∑
i,j
uivj
(
aij + nVn(z + eij)
))
(1.1)
Vλ (z) = λh(z) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
(∑
i,j
uivj (λaij + (1− λ)Vλ (z + eij))
)
(1.2)
In the remainder of this section, given n ∈ N∗, we provide a formula for the value of the
n-stage game. This formula is too complex to allow the study of the limit, nevertheless it
sheds a light on the asymptotic behavior of the value.
Notation. We use the following notations:
• Given t ∈ N, let Πt denote the subset of the state space Z defined as follows:
Πt = {z ∈ Z : |z| = t}.
• We denote the maxmin operator by val.
• For any (a, p) ∈ R∗+ × N
∗, we put :
Λp(a) :=
1
a
+
1
a+ 1
...+
1
a+ p− 1
=
p−1∑
k=0
1
a+ k
.
Proposition 1.1. For all n ∈ N∗, for all t ∈ N∗, let Kn,t ∈ M
I×J and Cn,t ∈ R, such that
Kn,t = Λn(t)H and Cn,t =
∑n−1
k=1 val
(
A+Kn−k,t+k
)
. Then, for all z ∈ Πt
nVn(z) = 〈Kn,t, z〉+ Cn,t
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the variable n:
For n = 1, for any t ∈ N∗ and any z ∈ Πt:
V1(z) =
〈
H,
z
|z|
〉
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
ij
uivjaij

 .
Then, V1(z) = 〈K1,t, z〉+ C1,t, where K1,t =
H
t
and C1,t = val(A).
The recursive formula (1.1) and the induction hypothesis for n = m implies, for all z ∈ Πt:
(m+ 1)Vm+1(z) =
〈
H
t
+Km,t+1, z
〉
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
ij
uivj
(
aij + 〈Km,t+1, eij〉+ Cm,t+1
)
=
〈
H
t
+Km,t+1, z
〉
+ val
(
A+Km,t+1
)
+ Cm,t+1,
the middle equality folows from the inner product properties and the fact that
∑
ij uivj = 1,
and the last one from the val operator properties. Hence,
(m+ 1)Vm+1(z) = 〈Km+1,t, z〉+ Cm+1,t,
where Km+1,t =
H
t
+Km,t+1 and Cm+1,t = val
(
A +Km,t+1
)
+ Cm,t+1, This concludes the
proof of the assumption. The rest is routine algebra. Note that Λm+1(t) = Λm(t+1)+
1
t
.
Corollary 1.2. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1). If N → +∞ and n
N
→ ρ, then limKn,N−n = −H ln(1− ρ).
Proof. Writing Λn(N − n) =
∑N−1
k=1
1
k
−
∑N−n−1
k=1
1
k
, the limit follows readily from the fact
that the sequence
∑n
k=1
1
k
−lnn converges to the Euler constant γ when n goes to infinity.
2 A differential approach
Given the current stage of the game of total length N , the number of stages until the
end of the game is denoted by n and in view of Corollary 1.2, the relevant asymptotic filter
for the convergence is not that of N → +∞ but the one of n
N
→ ρ ∈ (0, 1), where ρ is the
fraction of the remaining game. Hence, it seems natural to introduce a continuous version of
the dynamic game. To begin with, moving from the recursive formula obtained in (1.1), we
heuristically derive a PDE (Section 2.1). It turns out that the latter is precisely the HJBI
equation of some differential game that we shall define.
For any N ∈ N∗, we define the quotient state space and the uniform partition of [0, 1]:
QN :=
{
q : q =
z
N
, z ∈ Z
}
, IN :=
{
0,
1
N
, ..., 1
}
.
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2.1 The heuristic PDE and the differential game G(t, q)
We define the function ΨN : IN ×QN → R, such that
ΨN (t, q) := (1− t)Vn(z), (2.1)
where z = Nq and n = N(1− t). Then, ΨN satisfies for any q ∈ Q,

ΨN (t, q) =
h(q)
N
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
(∑
i,j
uivj
(aij
N
+ΨN
(
t+ 1
N
, q +
eij
N
)))
, t ∈ IN \ {1}
ΨN (1, q) = 0.
(2.2)
The first formula of (2.2), for any t ∈ IN \ {1} can be written equivalently:
0 = h(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
i,j
uivj
(
aij +N
(
ΨN
(
t+
1
N
, q +
eij
N
)
−ΨN (t, q)
)) .
(2.3)
When N → +∞, we heuristically assume that there exists a sufficiently differentiable func-
tion Ψ : [0, 1]×RI×J+ \ {0} → R (the limit of ΨN), which will therefore satisfy the following
(PDE) with boundary condition of (2.2):

∂Ψ
∂t
(t, q) + h(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
∑
i,j
uivj
(
aij +
∂Ψ
∂qij
(t, q)
)
= 0, (t, q) ∈ [0, 1) × RI×J+ \ {0},
Ψ(1, q) = 0, q ∈ RI×J+ \ {0}.
(2.4)
The differential game. Given (t, q) ∈ [0, 1] × RI×J+ , we define a differential zero-sum
game, denoted by G(t, q) starting at time t with initial state q. It consists of:
• The state space Q = RI×J+ .
• The time interval of the game T = [t, 1].
• Player 1 uses a measurable control u˜ : [t, 1]→ ∆(I) and his control space is Ut. Player
2 uses a measurable control v˜ : [t, 1] → ∆(J) and his control space is Vt. For t = 0,
we use the notation U := U0 and V := V0.
• If Player 1 uses u˜ and Player 2 uses v˜, then the dynamics in the state space is defined
as follows: {
dq
dt
(s) = u˜(s)⊗ v˜(s), s ∈ (t, 1),
q(t) = q.
(2.5)
Clearly, the dynamics is driven by a bounded, continuous function, which is Lipschitz
in q and thus (2.5) admits a unique solution.
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• The running payoff at time s ∈ [t, 1] that Player 1 receives from Player 2 is given by
g : Q×∆(I)×∆(J)→ R and defined as:
g(q, u, v) = h(q) +
〈
u⊗ v,A
〉
(2.6)
where,
h(q) :=
{〈
H, q|q|
〉
, q 6= 0
0, q = 0.
It is easy to see that g is bounded by ‖H‖∞ + ‖A‖∞ and since q : [t, 1] → Q is a
differentiable function of time (see (2.5)), g is differentiable on Q \ {0}.
• The payoff associated to the pair of controls (u˜, v˜) ∈ Ut × Vt that Player 2 pays to
Player 1 at time 1 is given by:
G(t, q, u˜, v˜) =
1∫
t
g(q(s), u˜(s), v˜(s))ds. (2.7)
Following Varaiya (1967), Roxin (1969) and Elliott and Kalton (1972), we allow the play-
ers to update their controls using non-anticipative strategies. A non-anticipative strategy
for Player 1 is a map α : Vt → Ut such that for any time t˜ > t,
v˜1(s) = v˜2(s) ∀s ∈ [t, t˜] ⇒ α[v˜1(s)] = α[v˜2(s)] ∀s ∈ [t, t˜].
The definition of non-anticipative strategies for Player 2 is analogous. Denote by At and Bt
the sets of non-anticipative strategies of the players respectively and let us put A := A0 and
B := B0. With respect to this notion of strategies, the lower and upper values are defined
as follows:
W−(t, q) := sup
α∈At
inf
v˜∈Vt
G(t, q, α[v˜], v˜)
W+(t, q) := inf
β∈Bt
sup
u˜∈Ut
G(t, q, u˜, β[u˜]).
When both functions coincide, we say that the game G(t, q) has a value, denoted by W (t, q).
Following Cardaliaguet (2000) and Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta (2008), the lower and
upper hamiltonian functions of the game G(t, q), H± : Q×Q → R are given by:
H−(ξ, q) = h(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
〈
u⊗ v,A+ ξ
〉
(2.8)
H+(ξ, q) = h(q) + min
v∈∆(J)
max
u∈∆(I)
〈
u⊗ v,A+ ξ
〉
.
Notation. In the sequel, Q∗ stands for Q \ {0}.
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Given (t, q) ∈ [0, 1]×Q∗, we have: (i) ∆(I) and ∆(J) are compact sets; (ii) the dynamics
in the state space (2.5) and the running payoff (2.6) are bounded, continuous in all their
variables and Lipschitz in the state variable q functions; (iii) from the minmax theorem in
von Neumann (1928), it clearly follows that the Isaacs condition, i.e., H− = H+ holds true
(see (2.8)). Then, by Evans and Souganidis (1984) and Souganidis (1999), the differential
game G(t, q) starting at time t ∈ [0, 1) with initial state q ∈ Q∗ admits a value, denoted
by W (t, q). Moreover, the authors characterize4 the value by means of the Dynamic Pro-
gramming Principle (DPP). Namely, for all (t, q) ∈ [0, 1) × Q∗ and all δ ∈ (0, 1 − t], we
have:
W (t, q) = sup
α∈At
inf
v˜∈Vt


〈
H,
t+δ∫
t
q(s)
|q|+ s
ds
〉
+
〈 t+δ∫
t
α[v˜(s)]⊗ v˜(s)ds,A
〉
+W ∗

 , (2.9)
where W ∗ := W
(
t+ δ, q(t+ δ)
)
with q(t+ δ) = q +
t+δ∫
t
α[v˜(s)]⊗ v˜(s)ds.
Furthermore under the preceding assumptions,W (t, q) is the unique solution in the space
of real-valued, bounded, continuous functions defined over [0, 1]×Q∗ of the following HJBI
equation: {
∂W
∂t
(t, q) +H
(
∇qW (t, q), q
)
= 0, (t, q) ∈ [0, 1) ×Q∗,
W (1, q) = 0, q ∈ Q∗.
(2.10)
where, H := H− = H+ is the hamiltonian defined earlier. Consequently, one can identify
the PDE obtained in (2.4) with the HJBI equations of (2.10).
2.2 Existence of the value in G(0, 0)
In this section, we extend the results of the differential game G(t, q) over the set [0, 1]×Q.
Precisely, we show that W (0, q) admits a limit as q tends to 0 and we further establish that
such limit is the value of the game starting at (0, 0), which therefore exists. The idea of the
proof lies in the consideration of ε2 -optimal strategies in G(0, q) that are ε-optimal in G(0, 0).
Lemma 2.1. Let q ∈ Q∗ and (u˜, v˜) ∈ U × V. Denote by q(·) and q˜(·) the trajectories with
initial conditions q(0) = q and q˜(0) = 0 obtained from (2.5). Then, for any s ∈ [0, 1], we
have: |h (q(s))− h (q˜(s))| ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞
|q|
|q(s)| .
Proof. If q˜(s) = 0, we get h(q˜(s)) = 0 and thus, |h(q(s)| ≤ ‖H‖∞. For any s ∈ [0, 1],
such that q˜(s) 6= 0, since q(s) 6= 0, it is elementary that
∣∣∣ q(s)|q(s)| − q˜(s)|q˜(s)|
∣∣∣ ≤ 2 |q(s)−q˜(s)||q(s)| . Since
the controls of the players depend only on the time variable, by the ordinary differential
equation (2.5), for all s ∈ [0, 1], |q(s)− q˜(s)| = |q|. Then, we obtain
∣∣ q(s)
|q(s)| −
q˜(s)
|q˜(s)|
∣∣ ≤ 2 |q||q(s)| .
Hence, |h(q(s))− h(q˜(s))| =
∣∣〈H, q(s)|q(s)| − q˜(s)|q˜(s)|〉∣∣ ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ |q||q(s)| .
4In the literature, the lower and upper values of a differential game have been first characterized by means
of DPP in Elliott and Kalton (1974).
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Lemma 2.2. For any ε > 0, there exists η ∈ (0, 14), such that for any q ∈ Q
∗ with |q| = η
and any (u˜, v˜) ∈ U × V, we have:
|G(0, q, u˜, v˜)−G(0, 0, u˜, v˜| < ε. (2.11)
Proof. Let us put G(q) := G(0, q, u˜, v˜) and G(0) := G(0, 0, u˜, v˜) and we further denote by
q(·) and q˜(·) the trajectories with initial conditions q(0) = q and q˜(0) = 0 obtained from
(2.5). Then,
|G(q) −G(0)| =
∣∣∣∣
1∫
0
(
h (q(s))− h (q˜(s))
)
ds
∣∣∣∣.
For all s ∈ [0, 1], it holds true that |q(s)| = |q|+ s. By Lemma 2.1, we get:
|G(q) −G(0)| ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞
∣∣∣∣
1∫
0
|q|
|q|+ s
ds
∣∣∣∣ = 2 ‖H‖∞ |q|
∣∣∣∣
1∫
0
ds
|q|+ s
∣∣∣∣
= 2 ‖H‖∞
∣∣∣∣
(
ln
(
1 + |q|
)
− ln
(
|q|
))∣∣∣∣ |q|
= 2 ‖H‖∞
∣∣∣∣ ln
(
1 + |q|
|q|
)∣∣∣∣ |q| .
If |q| < 14 , we claim that
∣∣ ln(1+|q|)∣∣ ≤ | ln(|q|)|. Indeed, since |q| < 14 , we have |q|(1+|q|) < 1
and thus, 1 < 1 + |q| < 1|q| , so that 0 ≤ | ln(1 + |q|)| < | ln(|q|)|. Then, for any q ∈ Q
∗ such
that |q| < 14 , we have:
|G(q) −G(0)| ≤ 4 ‖H‖∞
∣∣ ln(|q|)∣∣|q|.
To conclude, for any ε > 0, choose η ∈ (0, 14), such that η| ln(η)| <
ε
4‖H‖∞+1
and the result
is immediate.
Theorem 2.3. The game G(0, 0) has a value, W (0, 0) = lim
q→0
W (0, q).
Proof. Let ε > 0 and fix η ∈ (0, 14), such that η| ln(η)| <
ε
4(4‖H‖∞+1)
. Since the game G(0, q)
admits a value for any q ∈ Q∗, consider an ε4 -optimal non-anticipative strategy for Player
1 in G(0, q), where |q| = η, i.e., a measurable function α(·), such that for all s ∈ [0, 1],
α[v˜(s)] ∈ U . Then, for any v˜ ∈ V, we have:
G(0, 0, α[v˜], v˜) > G(0, q, α[v˜], v˜)−
ε
4
> W−(0, q)−
ε
4
−
ε
4
where the first inequality follows by Lemma 2.2 and the second inequality is due to α(·) being
an ε4 -optimal strategy. Reversing the roles of the players and following similar arguments
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we get that for any u˜ ∈ U , G(0, 0, u˜, β[u˜]) < G(0, q, u˜, β[u˜]) + ε4 < W
+(0, q) + ε4 +
ε
4 , where
β(·) is an ε4 -optimal non-anticipative strategy of Player 2 in G(0, q). Since the value exists
in G(0, q) for any q ∈ Q∗, we have:
W−(0, 0) = sup
α∈A
inf
v˜∈V
G(0, 0, α[v˜], v˜) > W (0, q)−
ε
2
W+(0, 0) = inf
β∈B
sup
u˜∈U
G(0, 0, u˜, β[u˜]) < W (0, q) +
ε
2
and we therefore get |W−(0, 0) − W+(0, 0)| < ε, which proves existence of the value in
G(0, 0) since the inequality holds true for any positive ε.
2.3 The discretized game GP (t0, q0)
In this section, we introduce a discrete version of our differential game and prove a strong
relation between its value and the value of the original repeated game. For that purpose,
we next consider subdivisions of [0, 1] and we define a family of discretized games played on
them.
• For all t0 ∈ [0, 1), P stands for any countable subdivision of [t0, 1] and if P is finite let
ωP denote the number of intervals of such subdivision, otherwise we put ωP =∞.
• Given N ∈ N∗, let PN = (t
N
k )0≤k≤N , where t
N
k :=
k
N
stands for the uniform subdivision
of [0, 1] in N intervals. We will also use the notation PN =
(
tNn
)
0≤n≤N
for n = N − k.
• Given λ ∈ (0, 1), Pλ = (t
λ
k)k≥0 stands for the countable subdivision of [0, 1] induced
by the discount factor λ, such that tλ0 = 0, t
λ
1 = λ, t
λ
k := λ + ... + λ(1 − λ)
k−1, for
k ≥ 1 and tλ∞ = 1.
• By πk := tk+1 − tk is denoted the k-th increment and |P| stands for the mesh of the
subdivision P, i.e., |P| = sup
k
|πk|.
Given P, for all (t0, q0) ∈ [0, 1)×Q we associate to G (t0, q0) a discrete time game adapted
to the subdivision P denoted by GP(t0, q0). Such a discrete time game starts at time t0,
has initial state q0 ∈ Q and is repeated ωP times. At time tk ∈ P, both players observe
the current state qk and choose simultaneously and independently actions uk+1 and vk+1 in
∆(I) and ∆(J) respectively. The control sets are denoted by ∆(I)ωP and ∆(J)ωP , indicating
that players now choose piecewise constant functions defined over the ωP-times Cartesian
product of their corresponding mixed strategy sets. We will use the notation uˆ = (uk)
ωP
k=1
and vˆ = (vk)
ωP
k=1. The state evolves according to:{
qk+1 = qk + πkuk+1 ⊗ vk+1, k ≥ 0,
q0 = q.
At stage k, the expected payoff that Player 1 receives from Player 2 is given by:
g(qk−1, uk, vk) = h(qk−1) + ukAvk (2.12)
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and given (uˆ, vˆ) ∈ ∆(I)hP ×∆(J)hP , the total payoff of the game is
GP (q0, uˆ, vˆ) =
hP∑
k=1
πk−1g(qk−1, uk, vk). (2.13)
Given P, for all (t0, q0) ∈ [0, 1) × Q, the game GP(t0, q0) admits a value. Following
Friedman (1970), the value of the game denoted by WP(t0, q0) is characterized by means of
discrete version of the HJBI equations (2.10):

WP(tk, qk) = πkh(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
(〈
πku⊗ v,A
〉
+WP
(
tk+1, qk + πku⊗ v
))
,
WP(1, q) = 0
(2.14)
We will refer to this equation as the dicrete Dynamic Programming Principle that will be
abbreviated to discrete DPP.
In the sequel, we compare the n-stage (resp. the λ-discounted) game with an appropriate
discretization of the differential game. Note that they differ essentially in the nature of
their outcome space: While in the discretized game GP (t0, q0), the play generated by pure
strategies is deterministic and lives in RI×J , in the original game ΓN (z0) (resp. Γλ(z0)) the
play generated by behavioral strategies is random and takes its values in a discrete subset
of RI×J .
2.4 Coincidence of ΨN and WPN
We first prove that ΨN preserves a very similar property to the one satisfied by Vn in
Proposition 1.1 and we then show ΨN = WPN . Recall that the map ΨN : PN × QN → R
has been defined by (2.1) and is characterized by the recursive formula (2.2). It is then clear
that an extension of ΨN to a map ΨN : PN ×Q → R is obtained if we define it by the same
recursive formula and terminal condition; namely for any q ∈ Q,

ΨN
(
tNk , q
)
= h(q)
N
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
(∑
i,j
uivj
(aij
N
+ΨN
(
tNk+1, q +
eij
N
)))
, 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1,
ΨN (1, q) = 0, k = N,
(2.15)
Proposition 2.4. Let N ∈ N∗. There exists a sequence (kn,s, cn,s) ∈ M
I×J × R where
n ∈ {0, ..., N}, s ∈ R+ such that for all q ∈ Q, and n ∈ {0, ..., N}:
ΨN (t
N
n , q) =
〈
kn,|q|, q
〉
+ cn,|q|. (2.16)
The general terms of the sequence (kn,s) are given for s ∈ R
∗
+ by:
kn,s = ΛN−n(Ns)H
Proof. For s = 0 we take by convention kn,0 = 0 for all n ∈ {0, ..., N}. Let q ∈ Q
∗, we
proceed by backward induction on the variable n:
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For n = N , ΨN(1, q) = 0 for any q ∈ Q
∗ and thus, one can take kN,s = 0 and cN,s = 0 for
all s > 0. Assume the result is true for n = m, i.e., for all q ∈ Q∗, there exist km,s ∈ M
I×J
and cm,s ∈ R, such that (2.16) is satisfied. For n = m, for all q ∈ Q
∗, we get from (2.15):
Ψ
(
tNm, q
)
=
〈
H
N
,
q
|q|
〉
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
i,j
uivj
(aij
N
+
〈
km+1,|q|+ 1
N
, q +
eij
N
〉
+ cm+1,|q|+ 1
N
)
=
〈
H
N |q|
+ km+1,|q|+ 1
N
, q
〉
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
i,j
uivj
(aij
N
+
〈
km+1,|q|+ 1
N
,
eij
N
〉)+
+ cm+1,|q|+ 1
N
.
and thus (2.16) is satisfied if we put:
km,s =
H
Ns
+ km+1,s+ 1
N
cm,s =
1
N
val
(
A+ km+1,s+ 1
N
)
+ cm+1,s+ 1
N
.
This ends the induction.
Notation. Given N ∈ N∗ and q0 ∈ Q, for all t ∈ PN , we define the subset of Q:
QN (t, q0) =
{
q ∈ Q : |q| = |q0|+ t
}
.
Proposition 2.5. Given N ∈ N∗ and q0 ∈ Q, for all t ∈ PN and all q ∈ QN (t, q0),
ΨN (t, q) = WPN (t, q) .
Proof. Both functions share the same terminal condition, i.e ΨN (1, q) = WPN (1, q) = 0,
for all q ∈ Q,
(
see (2.1), and characterization of WPN in terms of discrete DPP
)
. Thus, it
suffices to prove that ΨN and WPN satisfy the same recursive formula. To that purpose, fix
q0 ∈ Q and time t =
k
N
, where k ∈
{
0, ..., N − 1
}
. By the discrete DPP, it follows that for
all q ∈ QN
(
k
N
, q0
)
,
WPN
(
k
N
, q
)
=
h(q)
N
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
(〈
u⊗ v
N
,A
〉
+WPN
(
k + 1
N
, q +
u⊗ v
N
))
(2.17)
By (2.15), for any k ∈ {0, ..., N − 1},
ΨN
(
k
N
, q
)
=
h(q)
N
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
ij
uivj
(
aij
N
+ΨN
(
k + 1
N
, q +
eij
N
)) ,
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where q ∈ QN
(
k
N
, q0
)
. Equivalently:
ΨN
(
k
N
, q
)
=
h(q)
N
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
ij
uivj
aij
N
+
∑
ij
uivjΨn
(
k + 1
N
, q +
eij
N
) .
By Proposition 2.4, ΨN is affine in the state variable q and it thus follows:
ΨN
(
k
N
, q
)
=
h(q)
N
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
ij
uivj
aij
N
+Ψn

k + 1
N
,
∑
ij
uivj
(
q +
eij
N
)

 .
Hence, due to
∑
ij uivj = 1, we get:
ΨN
(
k
N
, q
)
=
h(q)
N
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
(〈
u⊗ v
N
,A
〉
+ΨN
(
k + 1
N
, q +
u⊗ v
N
))
.
This in view of (2.17), proves that ΨN = WPN .
2.5 Coincidence of Ψλ and WPλ
In view of Contou-Carrère (2011), the convergence is not uniform in the state variable
and as a consequence we cannot use the Tauberian theorem of Ziliotto (2016) to obtain an
immediate result on the convergence of the λ-discounted value, when λ tends to 0. In the
case of the n-stage value, coincidence between ΨN and WPN follows immediately from the
preceding paragraph since both functions admit the terminal value zero and satisfy the same
recursive equation. Concerning the λ-discounted game, we need to follow a slightly different
approach to prove such a coincidence.
Recall that the map Vλ : Z → R has been characterised by the recursive formula (1.2).
It is then clear that an extension of Vλ to a map Vλ : Q → R is obtained if we define it by
the same recursive formula; namely, for any q ∈ Q,
Vλ (q) = λh(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
(∑
i,j
uivj (λaij + (1− λ)Vλ (q + eij))
)
(2.18)
Given λ ∈ (0, 1), let us define the function Ψλ : Q → R, such that
Ψλ(q) := Vλ
( q
λ
)
. (2.19)
By (2.18), Ψλ satisfies the following equation:
Ψλ (q) = λh(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
i,j
uivj (λaij + (1− λ)Ψλ (q + λeij))

 (2.20)
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By 2.14, for any q ∈ Q, we get:
WPλ(0, q) = λh(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

λ
∑
ij
uivjaij +WPλ (λ, q + λu⊗ v)


= λh(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

λ
∑
ij
uivjaij + (1− λ)WPλ (0, q + λu⊗ v)

 , (2.21)
where the last equation follows by stationarity of the discounted game GPλ(t, q). In the
sequel, we put WPλ(q) = WPλ(0, q).
Notation. We use the following notations:
• The norm ‖·‖∞ of a bounded real-valued function f , defined on Q, is
‖f‖∞ = sup
q∈Q
|f(q)|.
• FB stands for the set of real-valued bounded functions f defined on Q with the norm
‖·‖∞. Clearly, FB is a Banach space.
• LB stands for the subspace of FB, such that if f ∈ LB then there exist bounded and
measurable K : R → RI×J and c : R → R, such that f(q) = 〈K(|q|), q〉 + c(|q|), for
any q ∈ Q.
• For all f ∈ FB and any λ ∈ (0, 1), we define the operator Θλ as follows:
Θλ(f)(q) = λ h(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

λ∑
ij
uivjaij + (1− λ)f(q + λu⊗ v)

 (2.22)
and clearly Θλ admits WPλ(·) as unique fixed point.
• For all f ∈ FB and any λ ∈ (0, 1), we define the operator Tλ as follows:
Tλ(f)(q) = λ h(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
ij
uivj
(
λaij + (1− λ)f(q + λeij)
) (2.23)
Likewise, Tλ admits Ψλ(·) as unique fixed point.
• Given λ ∈ (0, 1], for any t ∈ Pλ, we define the following subset of Q:
Qλ(t) = {q ∈ Q : |q| = t}
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Proposition 2.6. If f ∈ LB, then Tλ(f) ∈ LB and Tλ(f) = Θλ(f).
Proof. Let f ∈ LB. By definition of the operator Tλ, it is easy to see that Tλ(f) is also
bounded. For the rest of the proof, let λ ∈ (0, 1) and fix t ∈ Pλ. Then, for any q ∈ Qλ(t),
Tλ(f)(q) = λ h(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
ij
uivj
(
λaij + (1− λ)f(q + λeij)
)
= λ
〈
H,
q
|q|
〉
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
ij
uivj
(
λaij + (1− λ) (〈K(|q|+ λ), q + λeij〉+ c(|q|+ λ))
) .
Hence,
Tλ(f)(q) =
〈
λH
|q|
+ (1− λ)K(|q|+ λ), q
〉
+
+ max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

∑
ij
uivj (λaij + (1− λ) (〈K(|q|+ λ), λeij〉+ c(|q| + λ)))

 .
It is easy to see that there exist K ′ : R → RI×J and c′ : R → R such that Tλ(f)(q) =
〈K ′(|q|), q〉 + c′(|q|), where

K ′(|q|) = λH|q| + (1− λ)K(|q|+ λ) ∈ M
I×J
c′(|q|) = max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)
(∑
ij
uivj (λaij + (1− λ) (〈K(|q|+ λ), λeij〉+ c(|q|+ λ)))
)
∈ R
and it thus, clearly follows that Tλ(f) ∈ LB.
For the rest of the proof, since f ∈ LB, by equation (2.22) for any q ∈ Q,
Tλ(f)(q) = λ h(q) + max
u∈∆(I)
min
v∈∆(J)

λ∑
ij
uivjaij + (1− λ)f(q + λ
∑
ij
uivjeij)
)
= Θλ(f)(q),
which concludes the proof.
Corollary 2.7. Fix λ ∈ (0, 1]. Then, for any q ∈ Q, we have Ψλ(q) = WPλ(q).
Proof. By Proposition 2.6, since f ≡ 0 ∈ LB, we get that for any m ∈ N
∗, Tm(0) =
Θm(0). It is easy to see that Tλ and Θλ are contracting operators and it thus follows
limm→+∞T
m
λ (0) = limm→+∞Θ
m
λ (0). In view of equations (2.22) and (2.23), we conclude
that Ψλ = WPλ .
This result will allow us to use approximation schemes for differential games in the
subsequent parts of the proof. Since the value of the original game is equal to that of the
discretized approximated game, proving convergence of the value of the latter will prove the
convergence of the value of the former. One difficulty arises however from the irregularity
of the differential game at the origin.
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3 Existence of the limit value in ΓN(z)
In this section, we prove the main result of the paper. We show that the asymptotic
values of the N -stage and the λ-discounted games exist and they are independent of the
initial state z. We further show that limN→+∞VN (z) = limλ→0Vλ(z) = W (0, 0). For this
purpose we first provide some useful lemmas on the value of the original game VN (resp.
Vλ) and the associated function ΨN (resp. Ψλ).
Lemma 3.1. Let ω = (it, jt)t∈N∗ be a play and (zt)t∈N be the process in Z, induced by the
initial position z0 = 0 and the play ω. Then, for any z ∈ Z
∗, we have:
• for any N ∈ N∗,
|γN (z, ω)− γN (0, ω)| ≤
2 ‖H‖∞ |z|
N
(
ln
(
|z|+N
|z|
)
+ C
)
where C = 2 supN∈N∗ ε(N) and ε(N) is a function which goes to zero when N tends
to infinity.
• for any λ ∈ (0, 1], such that λz < 1, there exists N ∈ N∗, i.e., N + |z| = ⌊ 1
λ
⌋, such
that we have:
|γλ(z, ω) − γλ(0, ω)| ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ λ|z|
(
ln
(
1
λ|z|
)
+ Czλ
)
,
where Czλ = (1− λ)
⌊ 1
λ
⌋−|z| + C.
Proof. Fix z ∈ Z and N ∈ N∗. Then, we have:∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
t=1
h(zt)− h(z + zt)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
〈
H,
z
|z|
〉
+
N∑
t=2
〈
H,
zt
t
−
z + zt
|z|+ t
〉 ∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
〈
H,
z
|z|
〉
+
N∑
t=2
〈
H,
zt(|z|+ t)− t(z + zt)
t(|z|+ t)
〉 ∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣
〈
H,
z
|z|
〉∣∣∣∣+
N∑
t=2
∣∣∣∣
〈
H,
zt |z| − tz
t(|z|+ t)
〉∣∣∣∣
It follows,∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
t=1
h(zt)− h(z + zt)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖H‖∞
(
1 +
N∑
t=2
|zt| |z|+ t |z|
t(|z|+ t)
)
≤ ‖H‖∞
(
2|z|
N∑
t=1
1
|z|+ t
)
≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ |z|
(
ln
(
|z|+N
|z|
)
+ |ε(|z| +N)|+ |ε(|z|)|
)
,
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where ε(x) is a function that goes to 0 when x tends to infinity. We put C := 2 supN∈N∗ ε(N)
and we thus, conclude the proof of the assertion. To show the second assertion, in a similar
way, we obtain:
|γλ(0)− γλ(z)| ≤ 2λ|z| ‖H‖∞
∞∑
t=1
(1− λ)t−1
|z|+ t
Define N := inf{k ∈ N∗ : k + |z|+ 1 > 1/λ}. Hence, we may write:
|γλ(0)− γλ(z)| ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ λ|z|
(
N∑
t=1
1
|z|+ k
+ (1− λ)N
∞∑
k=1
λ(1− λ)k
)
≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ λ|z|
(
ln
(
|z|+N
|z|
)
+ |ε(|z| +N)|+ |ε(|z|)| + (1− λ)N
)
≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ λ|z|
(
ln
(
1
λ|z|
)
+ C + (1− λ)⌊
1
λ
⌋−|z|
)
,
which ends the proof of the Lemma.
Proposition 3.2. Let z ∈ Z. If VN (z) converges to some ℓ ∈ R (resp. Vλ(z)), then for
any z˜ ∈ Z, VN (z˜) (resp. Vλ(z˜)) converges to the same limit ℓ.
Proof. Given N ∈ N∗ (λ ∈ (0, 1)), fix z ∈ Z∗ and let us consider the games ΓN (z) (resp.
Γλ(z)) and ΓN (0) (resp. Γλ(0)). For a pair of behavioral strategies (σ, τ) we denote by Pσ,τ
the probability induced on (I×J)N , (resp. (I×J)∞). With respect to the probability Pσ,τ ,
by Lemma 3.1, we get:
∣∣γN (0, σ, τ) − γN (z, σ, τ)∣∣ ≤ 1
N
(
2 ‖H‖∞ |z|
(
ln
(
|z|+N
|z|
)
+ C
))
.
Since the right hand term is independent of (σ, τ) and the sup-norm of the value function
is less than or equal to sup-norm of the payoff function, we get:
∣∣VN (z)−VN (0)∣∣ ≤ 1
N
(
2 ‖H‖∞ |z|
(
ln
(
|z|+N
|z|
)
+ C
))
.
The conclusion follows by remarking that the right hand side goes to zero when N →∞.
For the rest of the proof, fix λ ∈ (0, 1). Likewise, by Lemma 3.1, we get:
|γλ(0, σ, τ) − γλ(z, σ, τ)| ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ λ|z|
(
ln
(
1
λ|z|
)
+ Czλ
)
.
Likewise, we obtain:
|Vλ(z)−Vλ(0)| ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ λ|z|
(
ln
(
1
λ|z|
)
+ Czλ
)
.
Note that Czλ converges to 1/e, as λ tends to 0. The result follows since the right hand side
goes to zero when λ tends to zero.
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Next theorem provides the main result of the paper. Given z ∈ Z, we first show that
VN (z) converges to W (0, 0) when N tends to infinity and we then prove that Vλ(z) con-
verges to the same limit, when λ goes to 0.
Theorem 3.3. For any z ∈ Z, lim
N→+∞
VN (z) = lim
λ→0
Vλ(z) = W (0, 0).
Proof. We first prove that for any z ∈ Z, limN→+∞VN (z) = W (0, 0). To that purpose, fix
ε > 0, choose η ∈ (0, 14) such that,{
η < ε12(‖H‖∞(ln(2)+C))
η ln(η) < ε12‖H‖∞+1
and in view of Theorem 2.3, we also require η to be such that for all q ∈ Q∗ with |q| ≤ η,
|W (0, q) −W (0, 0)| < ε3 . Choose some q0 such that |q0| = η. Assumptions on the strategy
sets, the dynamics and running payoff functions of Theorem 4.4 in Souganidis (1999) are
established in G
(
0, q0
)
. Accordingly, there exists δ > 0, such that for all |P| < δ, the value
WP converges uniformly on every compact set ofQ toW , as the mesh of the discretization |P|
tends to 0. Fix N0 = ⌊
1
δ
⌋+1 and associate to G
(
0, q0
)
, for all N ≥ N0, a discrete time game
adapted to the subdivision PN , denoted by GPN
(
0, q0
)
. Then,
∣∣WPN (0, q0)−W (0, q0) ∣∣ < ε3 .
From Proposition 2.5, WPN (0, q0) = ΨN (0, q0). By Lemma 3.1, for any z ∈ Z, we have:
|VN (z)−VN (0)| ≤
2 ‖H‖∞
N
(
|z|
(
ln
(
|z|+N
|z|
)
+ C
))
.
There exists z0 ∈ Z, such that z0 = ⌊Nq0⌋ and since |q0| = η, we have |z0| = Nη − ρ for
some ρ ∈ (0, 1). By definition ΨN (0, q0) = VN (⌊Nq0⌋). Hence,
∣∣ΨN(0, q0)−ΨN (0, 0) ∣∣ ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ (η − ρN
) ∣∣∣∣ln
(
η + 1− ρ
N
η − ρ
N
)
+ C
∣∣∣∣ .
Since η < 14 , we have ln(1 + η − ρ/N) < ln(2) and (η − ρ/N)| ln(η − ρ/N)| < η| ln(η)|. As a
consequence, we get:∣∣ΨN (0, q0)−ΨN (0, 0) ∣∣ ≤ 2η ‖H‖∞ (ln(2) + C + | ln(η)|) < ε3 .
Therefore, for every integer N ≥ N0,∣∣ΨN (0, 0) −W (0, 0)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣ΨN (0, 0) −ΨN (0, q0) ∣∣+ ∣∣ΨN (0, q0)−W (0, q0) ∣∣+ ∣∣W (0, q0)−W (0, 0)∣∣
< ε.
From (2.1), ΨN (0, 0) = VN (0). It follows that VN (0) → W (0, 0) when N → ∞. In view
of Lemma 3.2, we conclude that for any z ∈ Z, VN (z) converges to W (0, 0) as N tends to
infinity.
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To prove the assertion on the discounted value, likewise we fix ε > 0 and choose η > 0 such
that we have: {
η < ε12(‖H‖∞+Czλ)
η ln(η) < ε12‖H‖∞+1
In view of Theorem 2.3, we also require η to be such that for all q ∈ Q∗ with |q| ≤ η,
|W (0, q) −W (0, 0)| < ε3 . Following similar arguments to the ones of the first part of the
proof, fix λ0 := δ and associate to G
(
0, q0
)
, for all λ ≤ min(λ0, η), a discrete time game
adapted to the subdivision Pλ, denoted by GPλ
(
0, q0
)
. Then, |WPλ (q0)−W (0, q0)| <
ε
3 .
By Corollary 2.7, WPλ (q0) = Ψλ(q0). By Lemma 3.1, for any z ∈ Z, we have:
|Vλ(z)−Vλ(0)| ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ λ|z|
(
ln
(
1
λ|z|
)
+ Czλ
)
.
There exists z0 ∈ Z, such that z0 = ⌊
q0
λ
⌋ and since |q0| = η, we have: |z0| = (η/λ) − ρ for
some ρ ∈ (0, 1). By definition Ψλ(q0) = Vλ
(
⌊ q0
λ
⌋
)
. It follows:
|Ψλ(q0)−Ψλ(0)| ≤ ‖H‖∞ 2(η − λρ)
∣∣∣∣ln
(
1
η − λρ
)
+ Czλ
∣∣∣∣ .
Since η ∈ (0, 14), we have (η − λρ)| ln(η − λρ)| < η| ln(η)|. It then follows:
|Ψλ(q0)−Ψλ(0)| ≤ 2 ‖H‖∞ η(| ln(η)| + C
z
λ) <
ε
3
.
Therefore, for any λ ≤ min{λ0, η},∣∣Ψλ (0)−W (0, 0)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Ψλ (0)−Ψλ (q0) ∣∣+ ∣∣Ψλ (q0)−W (0, q0) ∣∣+ ∣∣W (0, q0)−W (0, 0)∣∣
< ε.
From (2.19), Ψλ (0) = Vλ(0). It follows that Vλ(0) → W (0, 0) when λ → 0. By Lemma
3.1, we conclude that for any z ∈ Z, Vλ(z) converges to W (0, 0) as λ tends to zero, which
completes the proof of the Theorem.
4 Conclusion and perspectives
In this paper we have studied two-player zero-sum frequency-dependent games with sep-
arable stage-payoffs and established the convergence of Vn and Vλ as n tends to infinity
and λ goes to 0 respectively, to the value of the associated differential game starting at
the origin, W (0, 0). A natural generalization of our existence result concerns a stage payoff
function g(z, i, j) which is assumed to be linear in z and such that the impacts of the past
and that of present actions are not separable, but combine together in some way. Lastly, let
us mention that since existence of the asymptotic value in the zero-sum case is established,
a study of limits of Nash equilibria payoffs in general-sum frequency-dependent games that
leads to some Folk-Theorem-like now seems to be possible. In doing so, one may compare
the asymptotic results with the ones obtained for infinite games by Joosten et al. (2003).
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